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In his book devoted to the spiritual Problem (1933) Nicolai Hartmann devotes much space to the problem of the relationship between philosophy of history and historicism. In the context of metaphysical reflection on the problems of history, the conceptual effort to identify it in any law, Hegel has undoubtedly played a decisive role in highlighting the essential spiritual dimension of historicity. In particular, his merit was to have defined and studied the notion of "objective spirit", and doing it the bearer, the rational driving the historical process. The spirit objective realizes his essence in his own liberation, which is not to escape some bond material, but in the process of consciousness because of which the mind discovers, recognizes, cultural appropriation of their liberty. And here's the general sense of the Hegelian conception of history results in an improvement in the consciousness of freedom, irrespective of the wishes of individuals, who are - compared to the objective spirit - mere accidents, so what is the historical movement of that that there is objective in individuals, not the extrinsic specificity. But it is a non-linear process, articulated in the lives of people and historical figures, whose But truth is only in the whole process (where articulation does not mean fragmentation, since Hegel states, "the spirit of the people is essentially a particular spirit, but at the same time is nothing but the absolute universal spirit - because this is one "(p. 44). Hartmann therefore acknowledges the merit of Hegel to have grasped the importance of the objective spirit, an important element of historical discourse is often forgotten and which instead will be necessary to go in any depth, however, have sinned in one-sided . An error in which Marx, similarly, would also be precipitated by reversing the Hegelian philosophy of history, and unbalancing the balance of the process on another important, but overlooked by Hegel, namely that of natural needs, or economic, and that makes consciousness a product of history rather than a constituent or essential. A philosopher as
Hartmann, who replied to what he calls a double sided, through a multi-layered conception of the world, and therefore of history, for which it is facing in "a process in which factors of all layers of being involved in a decisive way, a process that can at best be seen as the result of the overall heterogeneous forces, which constantly clash with each other "(p. 28), can not consider an operation that is conceptually valid, but unenforceable in practice, the aspiration to a comprehensive philosophy of history. But it is interesting to note that this level of scientific impracticality has historically led the way, according to Hartmann, a second degree of philosophical reflection on the history, of a more purely epistemological. Hartmann Windelband refer in particular, advocate the important distinction between science and nomothetic idiographic sciences, a problem along the line which he worked very well the young Cross, but is intended to give up a correct understanding of history, unable as it is, the science, to think the individual and by failing to provide concepts - in fact - not universal. One difficulty which Dilthey tried to replicate the historical knowledge is brought back to an intuitive understanding. But Dilthey was never able to define this method in order to encode it into one procedure, and this gave the oestrus subjective history in the hands of the scholar. But the methodological reflection on the history Hartmann started the second by a false problem, which strictly speaking is not useful - as the horizon of reflection - for any science: "Every science has worked tirelessly to its method - but not because it reflects on the method or the face subject of his research: rather, make their way to the extent where he devoted himself entirely to its own. Its progress is a continuous thing, try, fail and try again - as long as can take a step forward. Fight with your subject to dominate, and in that fight, wins his own method. The method, in short, is born in your hands as you work around the thing itself, identifies itself, indeed, with the progress of this work. If it creates a lot of thinking about it first, while it creates not San anything, and work until you really need not know anything. " So, according to Hartmann, the methodological problem would be of secondary importance, and his vanity would be even more acute in the flow of great historical discovery: if everything is historical, so is the methodological reflection, and it is the historiographical process as such. The abstractness and complexity of the tools of the historian can suggest a supra-historical procedures, but they must also be based, according to Hartmann, a historical consciousness prescientific based on tradition, namely the continuation of the past in the present . A full awareness of the historic nature of historical consciousness has become philosophical reflection leads to abandon the methodological problem and opens the door to a more "ontological", aimed to critically understand the "what?" Referring to history and its categories , but strong della critica alla filosofia della storia, e orientato a circoscriverne alcuni problemi.
Per quanto interessante e lineare, tuttavia, l’itinerario concettuale proposto da Hartmann, su cui torneremo per comprendere in che modo egli intenda istruire un’ontologia della storia, è viziata da un errore di fondo, e si tratta di un errore di valutazione rispetto alla filosofia hegeliana, che pure egli conosce in modo così preciso. Hartmann infatti racchiude il senso del pensiero hegeliano sulla storia nel perimetro sacrificato della filosofia della storia, ma manca nel cogliere come Hegel dialettizzi questo stesso livello d’indagine con quello metodologico e quello categoriale. Lo stesso storicismo trova in Hegel non un antenato, ma al tempo both a supporter and an overcoming. What remains important in Hegel's reflection on its history is the extraordinary account of a deep and widespread of all its problematic aspects.
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In his book devoted to the spiritual Problem (1933) Nicolai Hartmann devotes much space to the problem of the relationship between philosophy of history and historicism. In the context of metaphysical reflection on the problems of history, the conceptual effort to identify it in any law, Hegel has undoubtedly played a decisive role in highlighting the essential spiritual dimension of historicity. In particular, his merit was to have defined and studied the notion of "objective spirit", and doing it the bearer, the rational driving the historical process. The spirit objective realizes his essence in his own liberation, which is not to escape some bond material, but in the process of consciousness because of which the mind discovers, recognizes, cultural appropriation of their liberty. And here's the general sense of the Hegelian conception of history results in an improvement in the consciousness of freedom, irrespective of the wishes of individuals, who are - compared to the objective spirit - mere accidents, so what is the historical movement of that that there is objective in individuals, not the extrinsic specificity. But it is a non-linear process, articulated in the lives of people and historical figures, whose But truth is only in the whole process (where articulation does not mean fragmentation, since Hegel states, "the spirit of the people is essentially a particular spirit, but at the same time is nothing but the absolute universal spirit - because this is one "(p. 44). Hartmann therefore acknowledges the merit of Hegel to have grasped the importance of the objective spirit, an important element of historical discourse is often forgotten and which instead will be necessary to go in any depth, however, have sinned in one-sided . An error in which Marx, similarly, would also be precipitated by reversing the Hegelian philosophy of history, and unbalancing the balance of the process on another important, but overlooked by Hegel, namely that of natural needs, or economic, and that makes consciousness a product of history rather than a constituent or essential. A philosopher as
Hartmann, who replied to what he calls a double sided, through a multi-layered conception of the world, and therefore of history, for which it is facing in "a process in which factors of all layers of being involved in a decisive way, a process that can at best be seen as the result of the overall heterogeneous forces, which constantly clash with each other "(p. 28), can not consider an operation that is conceptually valid, but unenforceable in practice, the aspiration to a comprehensive philosophy of history. But it is interesting to note that this level of scientific impracticality has historically led the way, according to Hartmann, a second degree of philosophical reflection on the history, of a more purely epistemological. Hartmann Windelband refer in particular, advocate the important distinction between science and nomothetic idiographic sciences, a problem along the line which he worked very well the young Cross, but is intended to give up a correct understanding of history, unable as it is, the science, to think the individual and by failing to provide concepts - in fact - not universal. One difficulty which Dilthey tried to replicate the historical knowledge is brought back to an intuitive understanding. But Dilthey was never able to define this method in order to encode it into one procedure, and this gave the oestrus subjective history in the hands of the scholar. But the methodological reflection on the history Hartmann started the second by a false problem, which strictly speaking is not useful - as the horizon of reflection - for any science: "Every science has worked tirelessly to its method - but not because it reflects on the method or the face subject of his research: rather, make their way to the extent where he devoted himself entirely to its own. Its progress is a continuous thing, try, fail and try again - as long as can take a step forward. Fight with your subject to dominate, and in that fight, wins his own method. The method, in short, is born in your hands as you work around the thing itself, identifies itself, indeed, with the progress of this work. If it creates a lot of thinking about it first, while it creates not San anything, and work until you really need not know anything. " So, according to Hartmann, the methodological problem would be of secondary importance, and his vanity would be even more acute in the flow of great historical discovery: if everything is historical, so is the methodological reflection, and it is the historiographical process as such. The abstractness and complexity of the tools of the historian can suggest a supra-historical procedures, but they must also be based, according to Hartmann, a historical consciousness prescientific based on tradition, namely the continuation of the past in the present . A full awareness of the historic nature of historical consciousness has become philosophical reflection leads to abandon the methodological problem and opens the door to a more "ontological", aimed to critically understand the "what?" Referring to history and its categories , but strong della critica alla filosofia della storia, e orientato a circoscriverne alcuni problemi.
Per quanto interessante e lineare, tuttavia, l’itinerario concettuale proposto da Hartmann, su cui torneremo per comprendere in che modo egli intenda istruire un’ontologia della storia, è viziata da un errore di fondo, e si tratta di un errore di valutazione rispetto alla filosofia hegeliana, che pure egli conosce in modo così preciso. Hartmann infatti racchiude il senso del pensiero hegeliano sulla storia nel perimetro sacrificato della filosofia della storia, ma manca nel cogliere come Hegel dialettizzi questo stesso livello d’indagine con quello metodologico e quello categoriale. Lo stesso storicismo trova in Hegel non un antenato, ma al tempo both a supporter and an overcoming. What remains important in Hegel's reflection on its history is the extraordinary account of a deep and widespread of all its problematic aspects.
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